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GENERALIZING DISABLITY
Michael Ashley Stein*

By Frederick Schauer.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2003. Pp. xiii, 359. $29.95.

PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES.

INTRODUCTION

Published in 1949, Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek's article
The Equal Protection of the Laws1 has exerted longstanding influence on

subsequent Fourteenth Amendment scholarship.2 Insightfully, Tussman
and tenBroek identified a paradox: although the very notion of equality
jurisprudence is a "pledge of the protection of equal laws," laws
themselves frequently classify individuals, and "the very idea of
classification is that of inequality."3 Notably, classification raises two
sometimes concurrent varieties of inequality: over-inclusiveness and
under-inclusiveness. Of these, over-inclusiveness is a more egregious
equal protection violation due to its ability to "reach out to the innocent
bystander, the hapless victim of circumstance or association."4
Despite this shortcoming of classification, Tussman and tenBroek
objected to the process of classification only where the categories were
either empirically unsustainable or based on legally proscribed
characteristics.5 The use of classification as a method of administrating
* Associate Professor, William & Mary School of Law; Visiting Scholar, Harvard Law
School and Visiting Fellow, Harvard Law School Human Rights Program (Spring 2004Spring 2005); Ph.D. 1998, Cambridge; J.D. 1988, Harvard. - Ed. I thank Neal Devins, Mark
Kelman, and Sanford Levinson for sharing their thoughts; Andrew Teel and law librarian
Christopher Byrne for their research assistance; and Penelope Stein for her constant
support. My research was funded by an American Counsel of Learned Societies Andrew W.
Mellon Fellowship.
This review is dedicated to the memory of Hugh Gregory Gallagher, accomplished
disability rights activist (responsible for the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, the first
major civil rights legislation for people with disabilities), and disability historian (author of
FDR's SPLENDID DECEPTION, an account of how the president successfully hid his
wheelchair use). Hugh was a kind, wise, and joyful friend, and is greatly missed.

1. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L.
REV. 341 (1949).
2. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 751 (1996), for instance, ranked the Tussman & tenBroek article as the fourteenth
most cited law review article of all time.
3. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1, at 344.
4. Id. at 351.
5. Id. passim.
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policy was not itself opposed by the authors, both of whom were
distinguished civil libertarians.6 According to Frederick Schauer's
Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes ("Profiles"),1 this broad and
appropriate acceptance of classification is in stark contrast to current
mores, where decisions based on categories and generalizations - what
Tussman and tenBroek called classifications - are frequently denigrated
as stereotyping, or, even worse, profiling. In response to this now
prevalent sensibility, Schauer defends the morality of using
generalizations as a means of mediating modern-day life. He further
argues that the use of classifications is inevitable and can also be
desirable.
Part I of this Review sets forth Schauer's definitions, theses, and
conclusions. Next, Part II critiques some of the assertions presented in
Profiles. Finally, Part III extrapolates Schauer's analytical framework on
generalizations to employment discrimination under the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),8 an area not addressed in the book.
I.

GENERALLY SPEAKING, GENERALITIES WORK

Profiles defends the morality of decisionmaking based on
generalizations against a contemporary inclination to equate such
decisionmaking with the unseemly practices of stereotyping and
profiling. Moreover, Schauer argues that determinations based on
categories are both inevitable and useful.
As a definitional matter, Profiles divides generalizations between
spurious categories lacking statistical support and nonspurious
categories that are empirically sustainable. The nonspurious category
contains two further varieties: universal generalizations that are
always true because of either definitional ("all bachelors are
unmarried") or empirical ("all humans are less than nine feet tall")
reasons, and those generalizations that are relatively truer for
members of a particular group than they are in general ("bulldogs
tend to have poorer hips than most other dogs," or "teenagers are
relatively bad drivers in comparison to the overall driving
population") (pp. 7-19). It is this last category, in which decisions are

6. Both were progressive educators at the University of California, Berkeley. Among
their many respective accomplishments, Tussman was a constitutional philosopher whose
best known academic contribution is THE SUPREME COURT ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(Joseph Tussman ed., 1963); tenBroek was a professor of political science, and also founded
the National Federation of the Blind, an organization over which he presided for twenty
eight years. THE ABC-CLIO COMPANION TO THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 303-04
(Fred Pelka ed., 1997).
7. Frederick Shauer is the Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
8. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12,111-12,117 (2000).
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based on largely accurate proxies, where Schauer focuses most of his
attention and that he defends on pragmatic grounds.
Initially, Profiles supports generalizations as "an unavoidable
feature of our decision-making existence" (p. 76). This is because we
live in a complex society where people simply cannot conduct an in
depth and individualized analysis prior to every decision they make (pp.
75-78). Consequently, Schauer asserts that we utilize generalizations as
heuristics on a daily basis, whether in determining that flying from
Boston to New York is faster than taking the train or in believing that
Ford cars and Hotpoint refrigerators are sound products (p. 76).
Accordingly, even assessments we think are individualized are not
always so (pp. 101-07). He further notes that sustainable generalizations
form the bases for valid and rarely contested determinations in a number
of areas (pp. 1-6). The Internal Revenue Service, to cite one example,
effectively uses a "discriminant function" score to sort through
millions of annual tax returns and identify certain criteria that, on the
whole, are more likely to be associated with dishonest filing practices.
These include the underreporting of income among cash-paid
occupations like waitpersons and taxi drivers and the overly aggressive
assertion of charitable and tax shelter deductions by physicians and
lawyers (pp. 160-67). Even more prevalent are practices used by
insurance actuaries who, every day, apply generalizations as to life
expectancy, driving ability, neighborhood safety, and the extent of
related risks to person and property (pp. 4-6).
Nevertheless, because of a deep-seated Western cultural bias in
favor of particularity, Schauer maintains that generalizations have
developed a bad reputation and are therefore disparaged as
stereotypes, or even worse, as profiling (pp. 1-3, 15-19). In making this
point, Profiles illustrates the way generalizations have been treated in
the past. For instance, the Eleatic Stranger from Plato's The Statesman
recognizes the impracticality of tailoring a general rule to each
individual. At the same time, however, he states that it would be
immoral as well as a "disgrace" not to individualize that general rule
whenever possible (pp. 27-41).9 In a similar vein, Aristotle concluded
that an equitable solution should always follow when legal
generalizations produce unfair results (pp. 41-48). This concern with
individualized justice as a necessary corrective to broadly based
decisions motivated the practice of Equity in Western jurisprudence
from its inception in Roman law through the role of the Chancery in
England (pp. 48-54). Perhaps the most damning assessment of
generalizations was made by William Blake, who averred that "to

9. The subject under discussion was a training regime established by a personal trainer
for his student to follow in his absence. Pp. 27-41.
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generalize is to be an idiot. To particularize is the alone distinction of
merit."10
To Schauer, this negative estimation of decisionmaking based on
empirically sustainable classifications is unjustified for three main
reasons. First, nonspurious generalizations are frequently as accurate
as individualized analyses. Second, the use of statistically valid
generalizations is more efficient than particularized assessments.
Third, because of the accuracy and efficiency advantage to
generalizations, decisions arising through a generalized process are
widely perceived of as having greater uniformity and fairness.
Profiles first asserts, as a general premise, that using sustainable
generalizations often produces results at least as accurate as those
arising from individualized analyses. This is chiefly because
particularized assessments rely on individuals using idiosyncratic
judgment to weight and exclude factors, and thus are often statistically
less accurate relative to actuarial assessments (pp. 92-101).
Consequently, Schauer asserts that in a number of contexts, including
predicting criminal-recidivism rates, a formulaic look at relevant
factors is a better predictor than an individual determination (pp. 92101). Even Equity itself was arbitrary and unpredictable and so
necessarily reverted to more rule-based processes (pp. 48-54).11 Hence,
according to Schauer, cultural or historic pining for individual
decisionmaking as a source of greater justice may be misplaced.
Secondly, Profiles avers that relying on statistically valid categories
in the decisionmaking process is more efficient than utilizing
particularized assessments. Schauer illustrates this argument by citing
the example of uniform age-based exclusion (pp. 118-21). Some
drivers who are over the maximum allowable driving age would be
perfectly safe drivers, just as some individuals not yet entitled to vote
or drink would do so responsibly (pp. 118-21). Although using
categories will inevitably lead to both over-inclusiveness and under
inclusiveness, he avers that testing the particular abilities of each
individual covered by these rules, such as eighty-year-old drivers or

10. P. 20 (alteration of capitalization without indication in original) (quoting WILLIAM
BLAKE, Blake's Marginalia, in BLAKE'S POETRY AND DESIGNS 429, 440 (Mary Lynn
Johnson & John E. Grant eds., 1979). Other cultural references include the philosopher,
Baroness O'Neill, and the author, Thomas Hardy. See pp. 20, 303 n.14 (citing Onora O'Neill,
Theories of Justice, Traditions of Virtue, in JURISPRUDENCE: CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS 61
(Hyman Gross & Ross Harrison eds., 1992); THOMAS HARDY, TESS OF THE
D'URBERVILLES 361 (1999)).
11. In support, Profiles quotes Lord Selden's famous remark that "equity is a roguish
thing. For law we have a measure . . . Equity is according to the conscious of him that is
Chancellor, and as that is longer or narrower so is equity. 'Tis all one as if they should make
the standard for the measure a Chancellor's foot." P. 53 (omission and alteration to
capitalization without indication in original) (quoting TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43
(Frederick Pollock ed., 1927)).
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fifteen-year-old imbibers, would be prohibitively expensive.12 The key
to the justness of these rules, Schauer maintains, is not that they limn
perfectly accurate categories, but rather that on the whole they are
statistically sustaihable and not arbitrary (pp.121-26).
As a consequence of the greater accuracy and efficiency obtained
through the use of classifications, Profiles argues that people perceive
decisions based on generalizations as more uniform and fair. A
paradigmatic example of uniformity is application of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") to determine the length of a
criminal's jail time through a quantitative formula1
. 3 Although some
judges have railed against the Guidelines for constraining their
individual discretion,14 Schauer asserts that the Guidelines may
promote fewer mistakes exactly because of this limitation. Moreover,
when general rules, especially legal rules, are applied evenly to
everyone they create a perception of fairness.15 In other words,
uniform Guidelines ensure that those who come before a judge
receive equal treatment and perceive that treatment as fair (pp.
260-61).
Finally, because Profiles is not procrustean (even though it does
affirm that there is something that might be said in favor of
Procrustes),16 two broad exceptions are made from a uniform
application of generalizations. First, Profiles repeatedly contrasts its
12. This is because information itself costs something to acquire. As such, real-world
results differ from those academic economists observe under a perfect-competition
framework where information is free. See generally Christopher K. Braun, A Semiotics of
Economics, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 435, 443 (Robin
Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995) ("[I]n classical economics, the market
actors are viewed as having access to perfect information. All parties understand the benefits
and detriments of the bargain and neither is under compulsion or duress.").
13. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL. (West 2003).
14. See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, The Umpires Strike Back, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT,
Mar. 2004, at 15 (compiling complaints by notable judges against their discretion being
shackled); Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Attacks a Law As Infringing On Judges, NEW
YORK TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at A14 (reporting William Rehnquist's complaints against the
Guidelines); Mark Hamblett, Judge Takes Aim at Congress In Sentencing U.N. Shooter, THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 23, 2003, at 4 (detailing how Southern District Judge Robert
P. Patterson denounced the Guidelines and protested their application by issuing a lower
sentence).
15. Uniformity through generalization also promotes the concept of community.
Specifically, Schauer links generality and community by asserting that communities can only
exist insofar as each member gives up a certain amount of individualized treatment. Pp. 28491.
16. Hence the chapter heading "Two Cheers for Procrustes." The limited approbation
balances out the particularistic condemnation of the mythic robber. Thus,
[I]f, rather than stretching or removing body parts, Procrustes had simply said that all guests
would be fed the same amount, regardless of size, age, or appetite, or if he had mandated
that all guests would have to sleep in the same bed regardless of height or heft, we could
more directly replay many of the traditional debates about equality.
P. 222.

1378

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 102:1373

advocacy on behalf of empirically sustainable generalizations with its
disapproval of spurious categories. For example, Schauer reveals how
racial profiling is an egregious example of an unfounded
categorization (pp. 175-98) by describing how O'Hare Airport workers
subjected African-American women to unnecessary and degrading
strip searches (pp. 176-79). He demonstrates further that excluding
race as a factor when making safety determinations at airports would
lead to equally effective results (pp. 186-87). Any possible offset in
accuracy could be made up for by a small amount of added inspection
time (p. 190). The same is true for "DWB," or "driving while black"
(pp. 191-98).17 Second, within the context of sustainable categories,
Schauer suggests that there may sometimes be good reasons for going
against the jurisprudential grain of "treating like cases alike,"18 to
instead treat unlike cases as alike (pp. 199-223). He proffers gender as
one example, explaining that discriminators cite gender differences as
a justification for their actions despite the fact that those differences
are frequently themselves the product of past discrimination (pp. 13841). Moreover, nonspurious gender classifications have been overused
(pp. 138-41). In consequence, Schauer asserts that circumstances exist
where the law should choose to remedy historical overuse by choosing
not to utilize gender as a category (pp. 141-44).
II.

BEING MORE PARTICULAR

Profiles is a delightful, well-written book that is stimulating to
legally trained readers and also accessible to lay ones. This is in large
part due to Schauer's frequent use of entertaining and accurate
hypothetical examples.19 It is also evident when reading Profiles that
the author had a good deal of fun when writing, which always bodes
well for an enjoyable reading experience.20
17. See generally R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal
Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075 (2001). For state-wide studies of
this phenomenon, see DWIGHT STEWARD, STEWARD RESEARCH GROUP, RACIAL
PROFILING (2004), available at http://www.protex.org/criminaljustice/police_accountability/
RPreportFinal.pdf (Texas); Press Release, Data Collection Resource Center, IRJ Releases
Preliminary Numbers in Massachusetts Racial and Gender Profiling Study, Jan. 20, 2004, at
http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/article.php?article_type=spotlights&article_id=76
3 (Massachusetts); North Carolina Center for Crime and Justice Research, The North
Carolina Highway Traffic Study, at http://www.chass.ncsu.edu/justice/reports/hwy_traffic_
study_03.htm (2003) (North Carolina).
18. For perhaps the earliest exposition of this theory, see ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS § l131a-b, at 118 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962) (professing that "[t]hings that are
alike should be treated alike").
19. To cite only the Introduction, Schauer asks, among other things, whether: Swiss
cheese has holes, Capricorns are self-confident, teenagers are dangerous drivers, English
soccer fans are violent, bulldogs have bad hips, and Volvos are reliable. Pp. 1-19.
20. This is especially apparent when discussing the virtues and vices of pit-bull
generalizations. Pp. 55-78.
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More significantly, Schauer contributes to the antidiscrimination
literature by advocating for the inevitability and desirability of using
non-spurious generalizations. His arguments that as individuals we
need to employ generalizations to both understand others and to
function in an increasingly complex society are well taken. Moreover,
these points are infrequently voiced by legal academics21 who by and
large follow a societal norm disfavoring the use of generalizations to
mediate social realities.22 As such, Profiles constructively reminds
those engaged in academic advocacy that intellectual tools - whether
employing classifications,23 economic analysis,24 or non-mainstream
prudence25 - are no more than content-neutral devices that can be
applied in different settings and to different ends.
Profiles falls a bit short in its - ironically enough - occasional
lack of particularity, meaning that a bit more elaboration would have
been helpful in bolstering some of Schauer's arguments. For example,
he correctly notes that one of the dangers of particularity, insofar as
individualized decisionmaking is concerned, is that an adjudicator can
too heavily weight one consideration among several when trying to
reach a just decision, and thereby render a judgment that is inaccurate
or unjust (pp. 48-54, 266-74). By contrast, so long as the metric for
generalization is rational (for instance, requiring pilots to retire at
21. For an exception, see Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of
Antidiscrimination Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 564, 572-73 (1998) ("We routinely and necessarily
make decisions on the basis of generalizations about various characteristics of the people we
meet. Indeed, conducting the interactions that make up our lives would be an overwhelming
and unmanageable task without the ability to do exactly this.").
22. Although not specifically referenced by Schauer, this aversion to classification is
especially strong among those scholars averring that generalizations manifest an unconscious
bias towards biologically atypical individuals. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content
of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1995) (exploring prejudice as "systematic biases
in intergroup judgment"); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that racism is a
persistent phenomenon even when not intended or realized). For application of these
concepts to the area of disability, see Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social
Cognition, and "Innocent Mistakes," 55 VAND. L. REV. 481 (2002).
23. A thoughtful and provocative treatment is Mark Kelman, Concepts of
Discrimination in "General Ability" Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157 (1991). Kelman
argues that federal discrimination Jaw is conceptually too narrow to capture what he avers
are four distinct types of discrimination arising from the use of standardized employment
tests. Id. He further maintains that the distinctions utilized in the employment discrimination
context are "unprincipled" because they are grounded in empirically unsubstantiated
assumptions. Id.
24. For two strong objections to the moral validity of employing cost-benefit analysis,
see Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005, 1007-08 (2000), and Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity
of the Cost-Benefit Standard, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 135 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001).
25. For instance, the use of critical-race, feminist, disability, or queer-theory
perspectives.
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some uniform age between fifty-eight and sixty-two) as opposed to
arbitrary (e.g., mandating retirement at, say, twenty-five or at ninety),
the efficiency gained from a uniform rule can outweigh the
disadvantages to those individuals for whom greater justice might be
achieved under a regime of case-by-case determination (p. 166).
The first difficulty with Schauer's assertion is that it does not
sufficiently engage the counter-argument that choosing one rule over
another, even within a range of rational rules, can also result in
inaccurate or unjust decisions. Specifically, Profiles does not elaborate
enough on just how a policy maker is to weigh efficiency on the one
hand with justice on the other when drawing lines. Similarly, the book
could be more forthcoming on how statistically accurate a
generalization needs to be in order to justify its licit deployment (i.e.,
when it matters that pilots retire at one particular age rather than
another, even within the range of fifty-eight to sixty-two). The same
insufficiency also occurs when Schauer makes some other worthy
points along the way, for instance, his explanation for why our culture
accepts the use of generalizations in some contexts and not in others
(pp. 15-19). In the end, I believe that Schauer is by and large correct in
his overall assertions, but that Profiles would have benefited from a
fuller treatment of certain key issues.26
Moreover, Profiles would have benefited its readers by providing
more normative content. Schauer is right when noting that there are
instances of statistically sustainable generalizations that exclude
members of particular groups. He offers two telling examples: the
higher propensity of women of Jewish-European d_escent to contract
breast cancer and thus be excluded from insurance coverage (pp. 3440), and the predilection of English soccer fans to engage in violent
post-match behavior (pp. 37-40). In the first case, Profiles notes that
these peoples' identities, as women and as Jews, may be sufficiently
morally relevant to compel decisionmakers to ignore empirically
verifiable evidence and bear unequal costs. Contrast this to an equally
- or perhaps even more - verifiable circumstance of the presence of
English soccer hooligans leading to violence. 27 Yet the fact that they

26. Similarly, a point that is not made in Profiles, but which would have bolstered
Schauer's arguments is that the same individuals who oppose generalizations as harmful to
an antidiscrimination agenda at times favor their use when they forward this agenda. A
classic example are the generalizations utilized by plaintiffs bringing disparate-treatment and
disparate-impact litigation. See generally MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 484-510 (5th ed. 2000). As one
commentator aptly put it, "antidiscrimination law aims at a wholesale, not a retail, injustice."
Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination," Accommodation, and the Politics of
(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 831 (2003) [hereinafter Bagenstos, "Rational
Discrimination"].
27. Only a few diseases can be verified as having been caused by genetic anomalies with
a 100% expression, meaning that the presence of particular genes invariably manifests in the
development of the associated disease. See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
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are English soccer hooligans does not compel a moral decision to
eschew an empirically sustainable action (p. 39). Schauer provides
sufficient clues for a reader to infer that the difference lies in whether
the group has historically been subject to prejudicial treatment (pp.
138-44). This is a standard line of argument within the
antidiscrimination literature by those who advocate the use of
regulation as a means of remedying social exclusion,28 and is certainly
known to an august constitutional scholar like Schauer,29 but it is not
made explicit in Profiles. Nor does Schauer provide normative
guidance for how and where lines might be drawn in making these
determinations. This might be because Schauer wanted to frame his
argument broadly rather than limit it to discussions of group-based
constitutional rights. Nevertheless, because Profiles is otherwise such a
thoughtful treatment of generalizations and their use, and because
legal commentators continue to wrestle with the issue of the proper
constraint of antidiscrimination measures, these are unfortunate gaps.
III.

DISABILITY AND CLASSIFICATION

Conventional wisdom on the ADA's disability-based reasonable
accommodation mandates holds that providing an accommodation
incurs a greater cost than not doing so. Further, and more trenchantly,
legal scholars assert that accommodating workers with disabilities
under the ADA is theoretically and ethically distinct from conferring
remedies under previous civil rights legislation. Building on the
analytical framework sketched out in Profiles on the use of sustainable
categories, this Part argues the imperative of treating disability-related

HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 59-115 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994). In the case of
"defective" mutations of the BRCAl or BRCA2 gene associated with breast or ovarian
cancer, approximately 50% to 60% of women who inherit those genes will actually develop
cancer during their lifetimes. See Elizabeth B. Claus et al., The Genetic Attributable Risk of
Breast and Ovarian Cancer, 77 CANCER 2318 (1996). For an exploration of the misuse of
correlative statistics, the harm it causes, and a proposal for ameliorating this problem, see
Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, An Equality Paradigm for Preventing Genetic
Discrimination, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1341 (2002).
28. E.g., Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV.
235, 260-61 (1971). For a discussion within the context of antidiscrimination protection for
people with disabilities, see Mark Kelman, Does Disability Status Matter?, in AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND
INSTITUTIONS 91 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) [hereinafter Kelman,
Disability Status]; Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA L.
REV. 397, 422-68 (2000).
.

29. His publications include: AMENDING THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF A CONSTITUTION
(1994); CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1999); FIRST AMENDMENT OPPORTUNISM
(2000); THE SPEECH-ING OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (2000).
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accommodation on a moral level with corrective measures engendered
by longer established antidiscrimination statutes.30
A.

The Received Wisdom on the Disability Classification

Since the AD A's passage, a near-consensus of legal academics have
asserted that the statute's reasonable-accommodation mandates
qualitatively distinguish the ADA from better ensconced
antidiscrimination measures, most notably Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ("Title VII").31 In sum, these commentators maintain that
"real anti-discrimination law[s]" remedy the wrongful exclusion of
similarly situated members of protected categories from workplace
opportunity and thereby bring about equality for certain historically
marginalized groups.32 By contrast, in requiring employers to
affirmatively provide workplace accommodations to people with
disabilities, the ADA does more than eliminate discrimination. Instead,
forcing employers to accommodate those workers pushes the workplace
equilibrium and its financial calculus beyond equality.33
This paradigm of employment discrimination, which is so pervasive
that Christine Jolls terms it "canonical," is economic in nature.34 Its
clearest proponent is Mark Kelman, who distinguishes between
regulations preventing "simple discrimination" and those mandating
"redistribution."35 Simple discrimination arises when an employer
treats an individual differently from her peers, despite the fact that she
is equal as far as any "relevant" characteristic.36 A relevant
characteristic, according to Kelman, is a factor that does not affect that

30. For further exploration of these issues, see Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle,
Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. _
(forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Stein, Same Struggle].
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000) (barring employment discrimination on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin).
32. Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 'f.07 F.3d 945, 951 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J.).
33. An exhaustive list of legal commentators buying into this notion is provided in
Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination," supra note 26, 827 n.3.
34. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 643,
643-44 (2001).
35. MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES 195-226 (1997); Kelman,
Disability Status, supra note 28; Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 833, 877-89 (2001) [hereinafter Kelman, Market Discrimination]; see also MARK
KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE? THE CHOICE BETWEEN REGULATION AND TAXATION
8-9 (1999).
36. Kelman, Market Discrimination, supra note 35, at 840; see also Kelman, Disability
Status, supra note 28, at 93 ("Insofar as the employer or owner cares about the person's
status or traits that are irrelevant to such person's economic function, he or she is breaching
the duty to avoid simple discrimination.").
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employee's net marginal product.37 Consequently, individuals
countering practices of simple discrimination are asking only that
employers treat them the same as their peers who are "equivalent
sources of money." 38 In sharp contrast, a disabled employee requesting
accommodation by definition "concedes" her lower net productivity
relative to that of a non-requesting employee as a result of
accommodation costs. 39 In consequence, this worker is effectively
making a "straightforward demand for resource redistribution. "4 0 To
Kelman, an employer that is required through the ADA to provide an
accommodation has therefore been subjected to "an implicit
'regulatory tax'" whose proceeds provide in-kind (as opposed to in
cash) benefits to accommodation recipients.41
Moreover, as explained by Samuel Issacharoff and Justin Nelson,
providing accommodations to disabled workers under the ADA brings
about a dynamic that goes beyond equality.42 Title VII, they aver, was
predicated on the idea that certain groups preferred higher paying,
safer jobs, but were excluded by discriminatory barriers from
obtaining those jobs.4 3 By contrast, accommodation requests are
unrelated to simple discrimination, and the ADA "does not attempt,
even as a formal matter" to ground itself in an anti-subjugation

37. Kelman, Market Discrimination, supra note 35, at 841-42; see also KELMAN &
LESTER, supra note 35, at 199-208 (maintaining that employers are chiefly concerned with
individual net productivity rather than with aggregate gross-production values); Mark
Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1158, 1198-1204 (1991) (same).
38. Kelman, Market Discrimination, supra note 35, at 835.
39. Id. at 843. Thus, she "does not claim to merit the treatment she asks for because she
has the same relevant traits as the person who" was not accommodated. Id. But see Ron
Amundson, Disability, Handicap, and the Environment, J. Soc. PHIL., Spring 1992, at 113
("Someone whose disadvantage occurs as a result of a social decision has a more obvious
claim for social remediation.").
40. Kelman, Market Discrimination, supra note 35, at 880.
41. Id. Kelman further distinguishes between simple discrimination and accommodation
by explaining that the former invokes an unlimited-cost qualified duty, while the latter must
compete against all other demands for available social resources. Finally, Kelman
distinguishes the two norms on the ground that the non-accommodator bases his decision on
retaining real social resources (i.e., acting in an economically rational manner) rather than
on personal preferences (meaning idiosyncratic or illegitimate motivations). Id. at 852-54. At
the same time, it should be noted that Kelman has consistently pointed out that employers
frequently believe they are dealing with disabled employees whose traits make them less
net-productive, when in fact those workers would be equally net-productive but-for the non
inclusive organizational decisions made by those same employers. See, e.g., id. at 846-48, 87778 n. 71.
42. Samuel I�sacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination With a Difference: Can
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans With Disabilities Act?, 79
N.C. L. REV. 307 ( 2001) . For a farther-reaching application of Kelman's thesis, see Samuel
Issacharoff, Bearing the Costs, 53 STAN. L. REV. 519 (2000).
43. Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 42, at 313.
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command.44 Accordingly, while traditional antidiscrimination
provisions remedy past prejudice, the ADA "eschews this formal
equality command" and instead seeks to raise the disabled to a
position that is more than equal.45
B.

The Subordination Exception to Generalization

Recall that in appraising the use of generalizations, Profiles
distinguishes between spurious and nonspurious categories.
Additionally, Schauer notes that nonspurious classifications contain
both universal generalizations that are always true, and
generalizations that are relatively more accurate for members of a
particular group than for the public at large. Profiles defends the
morality of making decisions based on this last category, except in
circumstances when the empirical data upon which the decision maker
relies is itself the result of prior discriminatory practice. Although
Schauer does not sufficiently elaborate the normative basis for this
exemption from the general use of sustainable classifications, the
arguments he makes in Profiles reflects a well-known body of
academic literature when setting forth a subordination exception to
generalization.
From an empirical perspective, the accuracy of the generalization
about accommodated workers with disabilities being relatively more
expensive is uncertain. Nevertheless, because I have addressed this
topic at length elsewhere,46 and in order to engage the strongest
argument put forth by these scholars, let us assume that this
generalization is nonspurious, and also universally true. The key
question then becomes whether from an ethical perspective the
classification may be utilized as a proxy, or if instead it ought to be
disregarded. In other words, is the case of accommodating disabled
employees more like that of English soccer hooligans with a
predilection for violence, or like women of Jewish-European descent
with a genetic predisposition to breast cancer?
From a jurisprudential perspective, the paradigm of simple
discrimination contrasted with redistribution reverberates with the
philosophical scheme dividing formal (or corrective) justice from
distributive (or material) justice. The first concept refers to the notion

44. Id. at 311-14, 357.

45. Id. at 317.
46. See Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations,
53 DUKE L.J. 79, 103-08 (2003) [hereinafter Stein, Accommodations] (presenting and
critiquing the accommodation cost studies in depth); Michael Ashley Stein, Empirical
Implications of Title I, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1671, 1677-81 (2000) (same).
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of treating similarly situated individuals in a similar manner,47 or what
Schauer referred to as "treating like cases alike" (pp. 199-223). The
second category, drawn from the social-justice province, advocates
treating all individuals equally, whether or not they are in fact equal,48
which Profiles described as "treating unlike cases alike" (pp. 199-223).
Although the typical academic examination of the ADA does not
overtly articulate the paradigm in these jurisprudential terms49 instead expressing itself in economic ones - adherence to this
philosophical dichotomy is logically necessary. This is because, in
order to conclude that ADA-compelled accommodations bring about
something more than equality rather than remedying historical
prejudice, one must first assume that the disabled are not equal in
terms of relevant factors.50 Doing so requires a belief that
47. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1861), reprinted in 10 COLLECTED
WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 205, 243 (J.M. Robson ed., 1969) ("Fifthly, it is, by universal
admission, inconsistent with justice to be partial; to show favour or preference to one person
over another, in matters to which favour and preference do not properly apply."); HENRY
SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 267 (1907) (noting that "the only sense in which
justice requires a law to be equal is that its execution must affect equally all the individuals
belonging to any of the classes specified in the law").
48. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302-3 (1971) (defining distributive
justice generally as the theory that "[a]ll social primary goods - liberty and opportunity,
income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an
unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored");
AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 73-87, 129-52 (1992) (advancing Rawls's
conception of distributive justice by exploring the dynamic interplay of equality and
diversity). A few commentators have applied Rawlsian theory to people with disabilities.
See, e. g. , Norman Daniels, Justice and Health Care, in HEALTH CARE ETHICS 290 (Donald
VanDeVeer & Tom Regan eds., 1987) (maintaining that society ought to redistribute
resources in the form of health care to disabled people whose functioning would be enabled
with such resources); Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy, Justice, and Disability, 47 UCLA L. REV.
599 (2000) (arguing that redistribution of material goods sufficient to make disabled people
functional, and hence autonomous, is a moral obligation on society); Ronald Dworkin, What
is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981) (suggesting that
people with disabilities should receive wealth redistribution as part of a behind-the-veil
insurance schema).
49. A slightly confusing exception is Issacharoff & Nelson, who assert that the ADA's
accommodation mandate begins from a "unique . . . claim that differently situated persons
should be treated differently," by which they mean that the ADA requires the treatment of
disabled persons (who are different in a lesser sense) as nonetheless equal. Supra note 42,
at 315.
50. A few commentators take this point further by asserting that ADA-mandated
reasonable accommodations are in fact a form of affirmative action. See, e.g. , SAMUEL
LEITER & WILLIAM M. LEITER, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND
POLICY: AN OVERVIEW AND SYNTHESIS 53 (2002) (asserting confluence between the
provision of reasonable-accommodation and affirmative-action policies); Stephen F. Befort
& Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial Dissonance, the Supreme Court's
Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 75 (1999)
(arguing that because reasonable accommodation "is a concept alien to most
antidiscrimination claims brought under Title VII," it "is, in essence, a form of affirmative
action for disabled individuals"); Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities,
Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1996) (disabled workers
seeking accommodations "insist upon discrimination in their favor").
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accommodation costs are endogenously engendered due to the
disabled's biological inability, rather than exogenously caused by
socially contingent conditions.
Conversely, if one views
accommodation expenses as remedying unnecessary historical
exclusion, then their provision levels an uneven playing field much in
the same way as other antidiscrimination statutes.51
Contrary to the prevailing perspective of inherent limitations
restricting disabled participation, disability-studies scholars52 have long
argued on behalf of a "social" or "minority" model of disability.53
According to this framework, the physical environment, and the
attitudes which form it, play a crucial role towards creating the
"disability" classification. Thus, factors exogenous to a person's own
impairments largely determine the extent to which a given disabled
individual can participate in society.54 This notion is in stark contrast
to the "medical model" of disability which, influencing the received
wisdom, views a disabled person's limitations as inherently (and thus,
morally and properly) excluding her from the mainstream.55
An early contribution to the social model of disability was made by
Jacobus tenBroek, who argued that disabled peoples' functional

51. For a prudential discussion of why employers, rather than society at large, ought to
bear these costs, see Stein, Same Struggle, supra note 30.
52. Disability studies is an academic discipline analogous to that of critical race or
feminist theory, with dedicated university departments. Gary L. Albrecht et al., The
Formation of Disability Studies, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 1-12 (Gary L.
Albrecht et al. eds., 2001). For discussion of how the discipline has moved from the margin
to the mainstream, see SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY
(1998), and Catherine J. Kudlick, Disability History: Why We Need Another "Other," 108
AM. HIST. REV. 763 (2003).
53. As explained by one of the originators of the theory, the minority-rights model:
is based on three major postulates: (1) the primary proble ms faced by disabled persons stem
from social attitudes rather than from functional limitations; (2) all facets of the man-made
environment are shaped or molded by public policy; and (3) in a democratic society, public
policies represent prevailing public attitudes and values.

Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality, and Law: New Issues and Agendas,
4. S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 97, 105 (1994); see also id. at 101 ("[D]isability is
attributed primarily to a disabling environment instead of bodily defects or deficiencies.").
54. See, e.g., CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (1988)
(tracing the legal, limiting, classification of disability); SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED
BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 35 (1996) (noting the
difficulty in marking "the distinction between the biological reality of a disability and the
social construction of a disability"); Amundson, supra note 39, at 110 (1992} (stating that "a
handicap results from the interaction between a disability and an environment"); Richard K.
Scotch, Making Change: the ADA and an Instrument of Social Reform, in AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES, supra note 28, at 275 ("[A] social model of disability that conceptualizes
disability as a social construction that is the result of interaction between physical or mental
impairment and the social environment.").
55. See generally Kenny Fries, Introduction to STARING BACK: THE DISABILITY
EXPERIENCE FROM THE INSIDE OUT 6-7 (Kenny Fries ed., 1997) (noting that "this view of
disability . . . puts the blame squarely on the individual."}.
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impairments were contingent on "a variety of considerations related to
public attitudes," most of which were "quite erroneous and
misconceived."56 A more contemporary expression of the social model
of disability, and one applied to the ADA, has been proffered by Anita
Silvers.57 Silvers argues that the social framework traces the source of
disabled peoples' relative disadvantage to the existence of a hostile
environment that is "artificial and remediable" as opposed to "natural
and immutable."58 According to her, the ADA seeks to dislodge
traditional practices by sanctioning intervention into existing social
constructs through questioning an environment that unnecessarily
disadvantages people with disabilities.59 She therefore concludes that it
is erroneous to characterize the prov1s1on of a reasonable
accommodation "as advantaging the individual for whom it is made."60
Instead, Silvers explains that from the viewpoint of a person mobilized
in a wheelchair, disablement is experienced by lack of access to
workplaces, educational programs, medical services, and other areas
otherwise open to the public.
I generally agree with the disability studies perspective that the
ADA is an appropriate antidiscrimination device because it remedies
avoidable exclusion. At the same time, the strongest version of the
argument also has limitations. Not all exclusion from the workplace is
artificial; some barriers are both natural and necessary. Moreover,
there are workers with disabilities whose impairments even reasonable
(or super-reasonable) accommodations will be unable to ameliorate.61
The issue is where to draw the line between artificial and inherent
exclusion. Although an exhaustive discussion is well beyond the
boundaries of this Review,62 it bears noting that one way to
differentiate these concepts is by assessing the physically constructed
environment through Universal Design principles.63 This is an
architectural concept that seeks to create "environments and products

56. Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts,
54 CAL. L. REV. 841, 842 (1966).
57. Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13 (1998).
58. Id. at 75.
59. Id. at 124.
60. Id. at 132.
61. For an in-depth discussion, see Stein, Accommodations, supra note 46, at 90-109. As
an aside, in passing the ADA Congress also agreed with this perspective. See Michael Ashley
Stein, Under the Empirical Radar: An Initial Expressive Law Analysis of the ADA, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1151 (2004).
62. I attempt to do so in Stein, Same Struggle, supra note 30.
63. See generally Robert Imrie, Inclusive Design: Designing and Developing Accessible
Environments (2001).
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that are usable by all people to the greatest extent possible. "64 From a
disability rights perspective, a clear example of artificial exclusion
caused by non-Universal Design are the courthouse stairs that
precipitated the recent Supreme Court case Tennessee v. La ne.65 The
Justices never discussed Universal Design in ruling that States did not
have sovereign immunity to suits seeking court access under Title II of
the ADA. Nevertheless, in order to find that people with disabilities
had been subject to unequal admittance to judicial services, the Court
had to believe that this physical barrier was unnecessarily
exclusionary; to hold otherwise (as did the Chief Justice in dissent) is
to view the exclusion of people with disabilities as opportune, if
unfortunate. 66 If allowed to add her own concurring opinion, a
disability rights advocate would point out that there is no intrinsic
reason for constructing a public building in a manner that as a
practical matter excludes members of the public, including those with
disabilities.67 Hence, the provision of reasonable accommodation to
the courthouse ameliorates an insensitive and unnecessarily
exclusionary social construction of the physical environment.68
Finally, it bears noting that arguments similar to those now used by
scholars to distinguish disability-related accommodations from more
traditional antidiscrimination remedies, parallel assertions previously
made against equalizing measures for women and for African
Americans.69 The prevailing social convention for most of the
nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries held that women were physically
less capable than men.70 In consequence, women were excluded from
occupational opportunity on the basis of unfounded stereotypical
assumptions.71 Similarly, the manner in which prevailing wisdom
64. R. Mace et al., Accessible Environments: Toward Universal Design, in DESIGN
INTERVENTIONS: TOWARDS A MORE HUMANE ARCHITECTURE 156 (Wolfgang Prieser et
al. eds., 1991) .

65. 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004) .
66. Id.; see also Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367-68 (2001) (state actors
"could quite hardheadedly - and perhaps hardheartedly" exclude disabled persons from
employment opportunities) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
67. Other possibly excluded individuals include the (nondisabled) elderly and very
young, as well as people with orthopedic impairments, physical injuries and limitations, and
obesity.
68. Admittedly less obvious is the related impact that changes in physical design have in
ameliorating exclusionary methods of job structuring and administration.
69. Ironically, while these selfsame scholars uniformly and rigorously adhere to their
position about disability, they would most likely be greatly offended by anyone expressing a
parallel but equally retrogressive view about race or sex.
70. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908) (stating as a given that
"woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions" which "place her at
a disadvantage" relative to man with whom "she is not an equal competitor").
71. See generally JULIE NOVOKOV, CONSTITUTING WORKERS, PROTECTING WOMEN:
GENDER, LAW, AND LABOR IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND NEW DEAL YEARS 131-82
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distinguishes the treatment of the disabled from that of other
protected groups by conceiving of disability as a biologically
compelled reality, rather than as a contingent social construct, echoes
the historical treatment of race.72 In so doing, these scholars similarly
drape an issue of adaptable and variable social construction in the
guise of fixed and scientific veracity.73
CONCLUSION

Profiles provides a refreshing re-interpretation of decisionmaking
based on sustainable classifications. Schauer argues that the use of
generalizations is an inevitable process in a complex society, as well as
a useful tool in mediating social reality, because generalizations are
often more accurate and efficient than particularized decisionmaking.
As a result, uniform determinations arising from the use of statistically
sustainable categories appear fairer to the general public. Nonetheless,
a prominent exception to the morality of decisionmaking based on
broad classifications are instances where the sustainable empirical
facts are themselves by-products of past discrimination against those
groups. Although legal scholars assert that workers with disabilities
are less economically viable than their peers, and that providing them
workplace accommodations raises them above an equality
equilibrium, this Review has offered some thoughts as to a contrary
account.

(2001) (describing
participation).

the

ascendancy of

regulation

precluding

women's

workplace

72. See generally Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in
the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998); Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social
Construction of Race, in MIXED RACE AMERICA AND THE LAW 101, 102 (Kevin R. Johnson
ed., 2003).
73. See, e.g. , STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 30-72 (1981) (describing
how scientific thought has been historically misused to influence people into mistakenly
believing that blacks were intellectually inferior).

